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Abstract
The paper explores one rationale behind the existence of financial repres-
sion, with the latter being represented through the obligatory ”high” reserve re-
quirement for the banks. Using an overlapping generation production-economy-
monetary model characterized by the possibility of banking crisis, we try and
answer whether at all these high reserve requirements are related to discipline the
banks. Results indicate that economies with higher probability of banking crisis
should optimally choose higher income taxation. The correlation between opti-
mal reserve requirements and probability of crisis is positive only when the social
planner has exhausted his ability of income taxation.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E44, E52, E58
Keywords: Reserve requirements; Tax evasion; Information Asymmetry in
Financial Markets; Costly state verification.
This is a revised version of the fifth chapter of my dissertation at the University
of Connecticut. I am particularly grateful to my advisors Christian Zimmermann
and Dhammika Dharmapala for many helpful comments and discussions. All
remaining errors are mine. Email: Rangan.2.Gupta@huskymail.uconn.edu
1 Introduction
The paper explores one rationale, namely possibility of banking crisis, behind the existence of financial
repression. We follow Drazen (1989), Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), Haslag and Hein (1995), Espinosa and
Yip (1996), Haslag (1998) and Haslag and Koo (1999), by defining financial repression as a “high” reserve
deposit ratio requirement. The study attempts to assay whether there exists a plausible explanation as to
why the reserve requirements in some economies are higher than others. To put it alternatively, we analyze
whether the “high” reserve requirements are a fall out of an welfare maximizing decision of the government,
in an economy characterized by positive probability of banking crisis and tax evasion, and given that the
government is assumed to have access to income taxation and seigniorage to finance its expenditure.1 As an
aside, we also study if higher reserve requirements can be associated with higher degrees of tax evasion.
Now the pertinent question here is - Why, if at all, would a government want to repress the financial
system ? This seems paradoxical, especially when one takes into account the well documented importance
of the financial intermediation process on economic activity, mainly via the finance-growth nexus.2 In the
words of Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992): One obvious reason, as to why the government would want to
repress the financial sector, is motivated out of the fact that, “the financial sector is the potential source
of “easy” resources for the public budget.” Liberalization of the financial sector, often associated with the
lowering of reserve requirements, can reduce inflation in the economy3, and hence, lead to loss of government
revenue through seigniorage. Thus, the process of liberalization clearly depends on the initial situation in
the economy, in this case the position of the government budget. 4
Besides, the fact that “high” reserve requirements enhance the size of the tax base and hence, is lucrative
for the government to repress the financial system, an alternative line of thought is derived from the works
of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Giovannini and De Melo (1993). Both these studies
1In the economic framework, discussed below, the demand for money is a forced-demand, since banks are obligated to hold
a “high” fraction of their deposits as cash reserves. Money is assumed to have no other role. In such an environment, the size
of the reserve requirement decides the size of the seigniorage tax base, while the implicit tax rate is the money growth rate or
the rate of inflation.
2See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and the references cited there in.
3See Gupta (2005).
4See Drazen (1989) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for theoretical explanations regarding this link.
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suggested that, countries with an inefficient tax systems and large costs involved in tax collection, would
be more oriented towards the repression of the financial sector. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) addresses
this issue in a formal fashion, using an endogenous growth framework. They indicated that, governments
subjected to large tax-evasion will “choose to increase seigniorage by repressing the financial sector and
increasing the inflation rates.”
Di Giorgio (1999) presents an alternative perspective as to why reserve requirements in some countries
are higher than others, in suggesting that the level of reserve requirements are related to the degree of
financial development. Di Giorgio (1999) studies a simple productive economy with the process of financial
intermediation characterized by a costly state verification problem (as in Townsend (1979); Gale and Hellwig
(1985) and Williamson (1987)). As a regulatory policy, the banks are obligated to maintain mandatory
reserve requirement on deposits. The level of costs associated to monitoring activity is interpreted as an
indicator of the efficiency of the financial structure, since it is believed to reflect the existing legal environment,
the organizational features and the functional structure of the intermediaries. The analysis indicates that
when the cost of monitoring is negligible, the optimal reserve coefficient tends to zero. However, the paper
derives a critical level of monitoring cost beyond which the optimal reserve requirement will be different
from zero. The optimal reserve requirement is shown to be strictly increasing in the costs of verification of
the state. This result is indicative of the fact that financially developed economies have low costs associated
with the activities of the financial intermediaries (costs of information processing and project evaluation, as
well as costs of monitoring borrowers) and thus, rationally should have optimal reserve requirements lower
relative to economies with less efficient financial systems.
In this paper, besides incorporating the role of tax evasion, to test if at all degrees of tax evasion and
“optimally chosen” reserve requirements are positively correlated across countries, we also investigate an
alternative line of thought. We try to relate the sizes of reserve requirements, obtained from an welfare
optimizing decision of the government, with the probability of banking crisis in an economy.
The rationale behind this is simple, and emerges from the structure of the model. The economic sce-
nario can be laid out as follows: The production structure of the economy is characterized by a stochastic
production function. The firms require bank loans to finance their input cost. However, when the firms
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project is unsuccessful, the probability of which is private information, the bank fails. The possibility of
the firm hiding its true state is ruled out through the design of an optimal contract between the firms and
the banks. Since, the deposits are insured the government needs to bailout the banks. Hence, higher the
probability of banking crisis, higher the number of bailouts and the associated cost. In such a backdrop, we
analyze whether, it is optimal for the government to choose higher reserve requirements for an economy with
a higher probability of crisis. So what we ask is, if the high reserve requirements aim to discipline the banks
and prevent them from lending out more in a relatively riskier environment. Obviously, as discussed before
higher reserve requirements would yield higher government revenue. Given, that the government has access
to both seigniorage and explicit taxation, we try to figure out the relative emphasis, an welfare maximizing
social planner would put on the two instruments of revenue generation, in the presence of tax evasion and
bank failure, and the associated bailout costs.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Besides the introduction and conclusion, Section 2
discusses the motivation for our analysis and Section 3 is devoted to laying out the model formally. Section 4
and 5 lays out the equilibrium and the derivation of the optimal choices of the agents. Section 6 lays out the
welfare criterion and Section 7 discusses the process of assigning calibration in detail, and Section 8 derives
the optimal choice of policy instruments.
2 Motivation
The motivation of trying to relate high reserve requirements with higher tax evasion and probability of
banking crisis is, to some extent, data driven. Note for our analysis we use Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain,
which have traditionally had very high reserve requirements and higher degrees of tax evasion, and compare
them with four other developed European economies. Table 1 portrays data from some major European
economies and shows that seigniorage, has been traditionally an important source of public revenue in Italy,
Spain, Greece, and Portugal, but is almost negligible for the other European Community (EC) countries.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
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As can be observed from the columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, the Southern European countries have been
using both inflation and reserve–deposit ratio as instruments for seigniorage revenue generation. Column
4 of Table 1 reports the degree of tax evasion in eight European economies.5 Clearly, there does seems to
be a correlation, between the sizes of reserve requirements and tax evasion. Table 2 shows that the bank
reserve ratios have increased significantly in three out of the four Southern European countries taken into
consideration in the late 1980s but have come down over the next decade. Note in some ways Greece stands
out to be an exception. Interestingly, the four economies of our concern have increased the reserve ratios
while simultaneously deregulating their capital markets which were subjected to below market interest rates.
Table 3 outlines the periods over which major interest rates were deregulated and credit ceilings were relaxed,
in some of the important European economies. Tables 1, 2 and 3 vindicates the fact that the major means of
financial repression in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, during this period was via the “high” mandatory
reserve requirements.
The fact that reserve requirements in these economies went up after the financial sector got marketized,
leads us to our premise that high reserve requirements might be tied to possibilities of banking crisis. Where
reserve higher reserve requirements chosen by the monetary authorities, post liberalization, might hint at the
efforts of the authorities to maintain the financial health of the “newly” liberalized banking system, which
over the years having operated under variety of regulations might not be immediately ready to meet up to
challenges of a perfectly competitive market structure. It must, however, be noted that these economies are
merely examples and have been chose since they fit the requirements of our modeling of financial repression.
But, the analysis can be applied to any other economies that are subjected to “high” obligatory reserve
requirements.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The theoretical modeling in our paper is somewhat motivated out of Di Giorgio (1999). But unlike in
the paper, we model the government budget constraint explicitly realizing that bank failures and bailouts,
5For details regarding the calculation of the degree of tax evasion, see section 7.
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given deposits are insured, puts extra pressure on the budget and also allow for labor choice decisions in the
model. Di Giorgio (1999) assumed that the cash reserves held by the banks serves the role of insuring the
deposits. This in turn allows the intermediaries to repay their interest obligations even when the firm fails.
However, we allow for deposit insurance explicitly, and compare the role of seigniorage and explicit taxation
in the face of positive probability of banking crises and bailout obligations of the government. Thus, given
that, we are interested in seeking for an optimal mix of policy instruments, the government would choose
in order to meet the budgetary and bail out expenses, the need to explicitly model the government budget
constraint is compelling.
Moreover, the production economy model is somewhat restricted in Di Giorgio (1999) in the sense that
there does not exist a pure market for goods. This limitation of the model is handled by introducing labor-
choices in the model. The labor decisions by the worker to earn wage provides the completeness to the
demand decisions in the goods market. We however assume that there is only one factor of production,
labor, and not capital as in Di Giorgio (1999), and the labor demand is constrained by the availability of
loans.
3 Economic Environment
We study an economy with three types of agents: consumers, financial intermediaries and a consolidated
government–monetary authority. Consumers are further categorized into two types: workers/depositors and
entrepreneurs. The workers/depositors are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply inelastically,
with some probability, to the firms earning a specific wage. Labor income is allocated to savings and
financing of consumption during retirement. The entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are endowed with a
fixed amount of resources and have access to production technology. Financial intermediation plays the dual
role of providing depositors with a safe way of transferring resources into the future, given that deposits
are insured, and being the external source of finance to entrepreneurs. Moreover, given that the financial
intermediaries are obligated to hold a fraction of their deposits as cash reserves, they enhance the inflationary
tax base of the consolidated government. Note that, this assumption helps in generating the demand for
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money in the model. The consolidated government balances its budget on a period to period basis using
revenue from income tax, seigniorage and deposit insurance.
The economy is affected by ex post moral hazard due to costly state verification. The outcome of the
investment projects of the entrepreneurs, financed by bank loans, are private information; however, banks
can observe the same outcome if they are willing to incur some monitoring costs. Monitoring costs will
be assumed to be proportional to loans. As in Di Giorgio (1999), the assumption of a linear monitoring
technology wants to capture the idea that it is more costly to monitor large borrowers in comparison to
small ones. Implicitly, such an assumption emphasizes a positive correlation between borrower’s size and
the associated demand for bank loans. Note that the size of the cost of verification of state is also a ‘proxy’
for the efficiency of the financial system. A developed financial system can be rationally assumed to have a
lower cost of state verification.
3.1 Agents’ Behavior
3.1.1 Workers/Depositors, Entrepreneurs and Banks
Both workers/depositors and entrepreneurs and hence consumers within each class are a continuum with a
population size normalized to one. They live for two periods and have positive endowments, labor in the
case of the worker/depositor and a consumable good in case of the entrepreneur, when young but nothing
when old. All workers/depositors and entrepreneurs have their preferences defined only over consumption
when old.
All entrepreneurs are endowed with x units of perishable good.6 The entrepreneurs also possess a simple
stochastic linear technology. The identical production technology across the entrepreneurs can be formalized
as follows:
yt+1 = β˜ntδ (1)
6The positive endowment is required for technical reasons, mainly to solve explicitly for labor demand and wage rate. See
below Section 5 for details.
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with
β˜ =

β, with probability q
0, with probability 1-q
where yt+1 is level of output produced at time t + 1; nt is the labor requirement at time t; δ denotes the
labor share and; β˜ is a random technology parameter and is independently and identically distributed across
entrepreneurs. The technology is such that, by using one unit labor at time t, β>1 units are produced at
time t+ 1 with probability q, and 0 with probability 1− q.
The worker/consumer is endowed with one unit of labor n which he can supply inelastically to the firms
earning a real wage w in real terms, with a positive probability of φ. In the remaining (1 − φt) cases
the worker/depositor cannot find employment and hence has no wage income. The labor supply decision
is demand determined and is based along the lines of the lottery system outlined in Hansen (1985). The
motivation for modeling the labor supply decision in this manner emerges from possible lack of loans to
finance the entire labor supply in cases of very high reserve requirements. Note the probability, φt, of working
full-time is in turn endogenously determined by the labor demand from the labor market equilibrium. Even
though the production process is stochastic, since the firms borrow ahead to pay at the time of hiring, there
is no further uncertainty to the wage income of the workers/depositors, once he ends up with a job. The
consolidated government taxes the wage income at the rate of τ , but an exogenous fraction of (1 − α) is
evaded by the workers/depositors.
The preferences of a worker/depositor born at time t are summarized by the following utility function
and can be written as:
Udt = u(c
d
t+1) (2)
where cdt+1 denotes the consumption by an old agent born at time t. We assume that u is twice continu-
ously differentiable, and strictly concave; formally, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and limc→0[u′(c)] =∞.
Defining rdt+1 as real interest rate paid by the banks on deposits, the budget constraint of the depositors
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can be explicitly laid out as follows:
dt ≤ (1− ατt)(wtφt) (3)
cdt+1 ≤ (1 + rdt+1)dt (4)
where dt is the real deposits of the depositors. As is evident from the formulation of the young and old
age budget constraints (3) and (4), the model implicitly assumes the existence of unemployment insurance
operated by the agents amongst themselves.
Let L and l be the nominal and real loans paid to any individual project that entrepreneurs can borrow
from the banks, and ndt the demand for labor. Labor hiring is constrained by the available resources of
financing:
wtn
d
t = x+ lt (5)
When the project succeeds the entrepreneurs repay the nominal interest rate on loans Rl, while nothing
is paid back when the project fails. And given that deposits are insured and the banks are not able to meet
the obligations of the depositors, the government needs to step in and bail out the banks.
The entrepreneur maximizes his expected profit, given by the following expression:
max
L
Πe = qpt[β
(
x+ lt−1
wt−1
)δ
− (1 +RLt)
pt
pt−1lt−1] (6)
Note to ensure that the firms do borrow to produce rather than merely consuming their positive endowment
x, we parameterize the model accordingly to ensure Πe>x, holds under all possible circumstances.7
There is a finite number of competitive banks, which are price takers on their liabilities.8 Banks collect
deposits, keep a fraction, γ, as obligatory reserve requirements with the central bank and offer the remaining
amount as loans to the entrepreneurs. From their balance sheet, we have
Lt ≤ (1− γt)Dt (7)
where D is the nominal quantity of deposits. The level and conditions of intermediation activity are deter-
mined in the financial contract that we derive below.
7See the Section on calibration for further details.
8As Di Giorgio (1999) points out this assumption is analogous to assuming that banks behave as Bertrand competitors when
fixing the interest rate on deposits.
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3.1.2 The Financing Contract
We will assume the entrepreneur and banks to be both risk neutral. The bank offers a contract to the
entrepreneur establishing both the amount of the loan and its cost. Since the outcome of the project is
private information of the borrower, the entrepreneur will always have the incentive to declare bankruptcy
even if the project is in fact successful. The bank then accordingly specifies the contract such that when
bankruptcy is declared monitoring will take place. As in Di Giorgio (1999), banks will optimally adopt a
stochastic monitoring technology.
Let λ denote the probability of monitoring when bankruptcy is declared, and v be the punishment to
the entrepreneur (in real terms) caught misreporting the production outcome. Using the revelation principle
one can derive the optimal financial contract as the solution of the following problem:
max
RL,L,λ,v
ΠB = q(1 +RLt)lt−1 +mt−1 − (1− q)λclt−1 − q(1 +Rdt)dt−1 − qεt−1dt−1 (8)
subject to
lt−1 +mt−1 ≤ dt−1 (9)
mt−1 ≥ γt−1dt−1 (10)
qpt
[
β
(
x+ lt−1
wt−1
)δ
− (1 +RLt)
pt
pt−1lt−1
]
≥ ptqβ
(
x
wt−1
)δ
(11)
qpt
[
β
(
x+ lt−1
wt−1
)δ
− (1 +RLt)
pt
pt−1lt−1
]
≥ qpt[β
(
x+ lt−1
wt−1
)δ
− λv] (12)
v ≤ β
(
x+ lt−1
wt−1
)δ
(13)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (14)
where ΠB is the expected profit of the bank in real terms; c is the proportion of loans devoted to the
monitoring activity; ε is the premium on deposit insurance; Rd is the nominal interest rate on deposits, m
is the real quantity of cash reserves held by the banks; and p is the price level.
The constraints given by equation (9) to (13) respectively indicates the feasibility constraint, the manda-
tory cash reserves constraint, the participation constraint of the firm, the incentive compatibility constraint
and the fact that the selected punishment abide by the principle of limited liability. (14) is obvious.
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In the optimal contract (11) has to be binding implying that (1+RLt)
∗
1+pit
lt−1=β[
(
x+lt−1
wt−1
)δ
−
(
x
wt−1
)δ
], where
1 + pit = ptpt−1 , the rate of inflation at period t. The incentive compatibility constraint (12) then requires
that λv ≥ (1+RLt)∗1+pit lt−1. Since ΠB is a decreasing function of the probability of monitoring, banks will set λ
at the minimum level such that (12) holds. This implies that 0 < λ∗ < 1 and that v is set at its maximum:
from (13) v∗ = β
(
x+lt−1
wt−1
)δ
. Assuming that revealing truthfully gives him the same expected profit, the
entrepreneur does not misreport the production outcome and hence, (12) is binding as well. This results in
λ∗ =
l∗t−1(
(1+RLt)
∗
1+pit
)
v∗ . Given that banks are profit maximizers and qRL>c, under all circumstances, they will
lend all funds at their disposal hence (9) and (10) binds and we have, l∗t−1 = (1− γt−1)dt−1. Note to ensure
that the banks lend all their available resources we parameterize the model accordingly to ensure qRL>c,
holds under all possible circumstances.9
Thus in summary, the optimal financial contract offered by the competitive bank, given qRL>c, is:
(a) l∗t−1 = (1− γt−1)dt−1,
(b) (1+RLt)
∗
1+pit
lt−1 = β[
(
(x+lt−1)
wt−1
)δ
−
(
x
wt−1
)δ
],
(c) λ∗ =
l∗t−1(
(1+RLt)
∗
1+pit
)
v∗ , and
(d) v∗ = β
(
(x+lt−1)
wt−1
)δ
n∗t−1, w
∗
t−1 and
1+RLt
1+pit
is determined simultaneously from equation (5), the loan market equilibrium condition;
the first order condition derived from equation (6) and; a linearized version of equation (11). Note we linearize
around the steady-state value of the labor endowment, nˆ, which corresponds to the employment rates in
respective economies, or put alternatively, one less the rate of unemployment.
3.2 Government
The government has a fixed “purposeless” spending of g units (per young person) each period. The revenue
needed to fund this expenditure and the bail out costs when a firm fails comes from the revenue raised
by the two wings of the government: the treasury and the central bank. The former collects income taxes
from the young workers/depositors, a fraction (1-α) of which is evaded. The latter controls the nominal
stock of money, M , contributing to the government’s revenue needs by new creating money and the reserve
9See Section 7 for further details.
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requirements. Formally, the government budget constraint in real per capita terms can be written out as
follows:
gt = ατtwtφt +
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
+ qεtdt − (1− q)(1 +Rdt+1)dt − (1− q)dt (15)
Or,
gt = ατtwtφt + γt(
µt
1 + µt
)dt + qεtdt − (1− q)(1 +Rdt+1)dt − (1− q)dt (16)
Given that Mt = (1 + µt)Mt−1 and Mt = γtDt, where µt is the growth rate of the nominal money stock.
Note the first three terms respectively indicate the government revenue from tax, seigniorage and deposit
insurance given that the project is successful with probability q, while the last two terms respectively shows
the bail out expenditure for the government when the firm and hence the bank fails, and the cost incurred
by the government in case the deposit insurance premium is subsidized, and not actuarially fair. Note an
actuarially fair insurance would imply setting ε equal to the probability of failure, 1 − q. Without any
loss of generality we will assume that government expenses are proportional to expected labor income, i.e.,
gt=κwtφt.
4 Equilibrium
A valid perfect-foresight, competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices {pt, wt, Rdt, RLt}∞t=0,
allocations {cdt , nt, cet}∞t=0, stocks of financial assets {mt, dt, lt}∞t=0, and policy variables {γt, µt, τt, gt}∞t=0 such
that:
• Taking the labor endowment, τt, gt, β, γt, µt, pt, wt and rdt the depositors optimal savings and
consumption behavior is characterized by (3) and (4) ;
• Taking the endowment, τt, gt, β, γt, µt, pt, wt and rdt the entrepreneurs optimal behavior is charac-
terized by (6);
• Banks maximize the return to deposits, taking, β, γt−1, εt−1, q, c and µt−1 as given by (8);
• Goods, labor and money markets clear.
• The government budget constraint holds on a period-to-period basis.
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5 Optimal Allocations
The profit maximization of the entrepreneur suggests that marginal product of labor is equal to the gross
real interest rate on loans and hence yields the following condition:
βδ
(
x+ lt−1
wt−1
)(δ−1) 1
wt−1
=
(1 +RLt)∗
1 + pit
(17)
Linearization of the binding-form of equation (11), yields:
(1 +RLt)∗
1 + pit
= nˆ(δ−1)
β
wt−1
(18)
Realizing that φt = ndt and using (5), (17) and (18), n∗t , the optimal level of labor hiring, is given by:
n∗t = nˆ (19)
Moreover using (5) and (19) w∗t−1 and the optimal real interest rate on loans (1+ rLt)
∗ (= (1+RLt)
∗
1+pit
) is given
by the following expressions
w∗t−1 =
x
(1− [(1− γt−1)(1− ατt−1)])
1
nˆ
(20)
(1 + rLt)∗ =
βnˆδ (1− [(1− γt−1)(1− ατt−1)])
x
(21)
The optimal choices of the worker/depositor can be derived directly from equation (5) and the budget
constraints, and is given as follows:
d∗t = (1− ατt)
x
1− (1− γt)(1− ατt) (22)
cd
∗
t+1 = (1 + r
∗
dt+1)(1− ατt)
x
1− (1− γt)(1− ατt) (23)
Entrepreneurs consumption at time t+ 1 is a random variable with the following distribution:
cet+1 =

βnˆδ−1[nˆ− δ(1− γt)(1− ατt)], with probability q
0, with probability 1-q
(24)
where cet+1 is the consumption of the entrepreneur at period t+ 1.
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λ∗ =
δ
nˆ
(1− γt−1)(1− ατt−1) (25)
Note that (14) is automatically satisfied.
Free entry in the banking industry implies zero profits in the sector. By substitution of equation (5) and
the set of optimal choices derived from the financing contract, equations (21) and (25), we have:
(1 + r∗dt) =

(
βnˆδ(1−γt−1)[1−(1−γt−1)(1−ατt−1)]
x
)
+ γt−1q(1+µt−1) −
(
1−q
q
)
c δnˆ
(1−γt−1)2(1−ατt−1)
1+µt−1
− εt−11+µt−1
 (26)
Moreover, in steady-state the money market clearing condition implies that ptpt−1=
1
1+µt
.
6 The Welfare Criterion
In this simple economy, the objective of a benevolent government-monetary authority is to maximize the
social welfare. The social welfare can be defined as an weighted average of the expected utility of con-
sumption of both depositors and entrepreneurs. Here we restrict ourselves to a stationary economy, with
no growth. Note changes in government policy tools not only affect the return on deposits, but also the
future consumption of the entrepreneurs. Given that the entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, they maximize their
expected consumption. The steady-state level of welfare for all future generations is obtained by substituting
the equilibrium decision rules into the agents utility function, to yield the following social welfare function:
Ω =

θu



βnˆδ(1−γ)[1−(1−γ)(1−ατ)]
x
+ γ
1+µ
− 1−q
q
c δ
nˆ
(1−γ)2(1−ατ)
1+µ
− ε
1+µ
 (1− ατ) x1−(1−γ)(1−ατ)

+(1− θ) qβnˆδ−1 (nˆ− δ(1− γt)(1− ατt))

(27)
where Ω is the steady-state social welfare, and; θ ([1 − θ]) is the weight assigned to the welfare of the
depositor (entrepreneur). The social planner maximizes Ω choosing τ , γ, µ = pi given u, q, c, x, α, β, θ, δ
and ε, to determine the optimal choices of the policy variables, subject to the set of inequality constraints:
τmin ≤ τ ≤ 1, γmin ≤ γ ≤ 1, µ ≥ µmin and the government budget constraint (16) evaluated at the steady
state. For the rationale of assigned minimum values of τ , γ and µ, see below the section on calibration. A
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standard utility function of the following type is chosen for deriving the optimal values of the policy variables:
u(ct+1) =
c(1−σ)
1− σ (28)
7 Calibration
In this section we attribute values to the parameters, most of them being country–specific. The problem
for the social planner is a non-linear constrained maximization problem, which cannot be solve analytically.
Hence, assigning values to the parameters of the model is critical. We select the parameter values for
our benchmark model using a combination of figures from previous studies and facts about the economic
experience for our sample economies between 1980 and 1998. Note, unless otherwise stated, the source for
all data is the IMF – International Financial Statistics (IFS).
• σ: The risk-aversion parameter in the utility function is set to 1.10
• q: The parameter measures the probability of success of the entrepreneurial project. Note q is tied
with the probability of the success of the banks as well. In other words, the probability with which
the production process fails is equivalent to the probability of a banking crisis. The probability of
banking crisis for the economies of our concern, conditional on the fact that the financial markets
were liberalized in these economies, over the period of 1980 to 1998, were derived using a methodology
that closely mirrors the one outlined in the Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) study to obtain
the probability of banking crises in our chosen set of economies. A multivariate logit model of the
following type was fitted to the panel data:
logL =
T∑
t=1
n∑
1
{Pi,t log[F (β′Xi,t)] + (1− Pi,t) log[1− F (β′Xi,t)]} (29)
Note the probability that a crisis will occur at a particular time in a particular country is hypothesized
to be a function of a vector of n variables Xi,t, which includes the financial liberalization dummy, a
10The policy experiments were repeated for σ= 1
2
and σ= 2, but the qualitative nature of our results stayed the same. Our
analysis, thus, is not contingent upon the value of the risk aversion parameter. The results have not been tabulated to save
space, however, they can be made available upon request.
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constant and n− 2 control variables. Pi,t denotes the dummy variable that takes the value one when
the i− th country experiences a banking crises at time point t and zero otherwise. β is the vector of n
unknown coefficients and F (β′Xi,t) is the cumulative probability density function calculated at β′Xi,t.
Note to model F we use the logistic functional form. Thus it must be realized that the estimated
coefficients do not indicate the increase in the probability of crises following one-unit increase in the
corresponding explanatory variables as in standard linear regression models. Instead, the coefficients
capture the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on log Pi,t1−Pi,t . Therefore the sign of the
coefficient does indicate the direction of the change and the magnitude depends on the slope of the
cumulative distribution function at β′Xi,t.
To construct the banking crises dummy we use the dates of banking crises reported in Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt
and Detragiache (2001) and is reported in Table 4. The criteria used in the study to identify banking
crises comprised of at least one of the following: “The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in
the banking system exceeded 10 percent; the cost of rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP;
banking sector problems resulted in a large-scale nationalization of banks; extensive bank runs took
place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit
guarantees were enacted by the government in response to the crisis.” In case the above set of criteria
failed to identify the banking crises we followed a more stringent measure of banking crises as adapted
by Ganapolsky (2003). Using monthly data on deposits a bank run was an episode where there was at
least 5 percent reduction in total deposits during at least 2 months in a row and lasted until deposits
started to recover again.
Given that in most countries the removal of interest rate controls were the centerpiece of the liber-
alization process, the financial liberalization variable is captured by a dummy (FINLIB) that takes
the value 1 in a specific year and country if the interest rates have already been liberalized by then.
Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) points out that proxying financial liberalization by real inter-
est rates in a panel data structure would be misleading and a hence a dummy variable needs to be
assigned. To identify the years of financial liberalization the first year in which some interest rates were
liberalized has been chosen as the date of interest rates liberalization for the countries in our sample
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and is reported in Table 3 and is repeated in Table 4 for the sake of convenience.
Using the criteria laid out above, Table 4 identifies dates of interest rate liberalization and the dates
of banking crises for Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal over the sample period of 1980-1998. However,
using the same criteria, no crises could be identified over the same sample period for Belgium, France,
Germany and U.K.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The control variables in the logistic regression can be broadly categorized into two sets. The first
group captures macroeconomic developments that affects bank performance mainly through the level
of non-performing loans and includes the rate of growth of real GDP (Growth), the change in external
terms of trade (TOT Change), and the rate of inflation (Inflation). The real short-term interest
rate (Real Interest Rate) is also introduced as a control variable because, whether financial markets
are liberalized or not, banking sector problems are generally associated with high real interest rates.
Following Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) we use rate of interest on short-term government
paper or a central bank rate as a measure the short-term interest rate.
The second group of control variables included define characteristics of the banking system, such as
fragility to sudden capital outflows (M2/Reserves): measured by the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange
reserves; liquidity (Cash/Bank): measured by the ratio of bank cash and reserves to bank assets;
exposure to private sector (Private/GDP): measured by the ratio of loans to the private sector to GDP;
and two-period lagged credit growth (Credit Growth−2), which captures the fact that “high rates of
credit expansion may finance an asset price bubble that, when it bursts, causes a banking crises.”
Finally, GDP per capita (GDP/CAP) is used to indicate the level of development of the country.
Note the terms in the brackets correspond to the definition of the variables in the logistic model. The
estimates of the multivariate logit model are reported in Table 5. Note except for the external terms of
trade all the measurements follow Table 4.9 in Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2001). For the terms
of trade we use the ratio of export to import price.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
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One observes the following facts from Table 5: (a) just like Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2001), the
financial liberalization dummy is positively, though not significantly, correlated with the probability of
banking crises. This suggests that financial liberalization is a factor leading to banking sector fragility;
(b) The probability of banking crises tends to be associated with lower growth rates, adverse terms
of trade changes, high real interest rates and high inflation; (c) the banking sector is found to be
vulnerable to a speculative attack against currency. Besides, the liquidity measure and the exposure
to the private sector tends to affect the probability of crisis in a positive (and significant) and negative
manner, respectively; (d) a sudden capital outflow is not found to enhance the possibility of a crisis; (e)
finally, GDP per capita is significantly and negatively correlated to the probability of banking crises,
suggesting that, other things equal, developing countries are more vulnerable to banking crises.
Once the multivariate logit model was estimated the probability of banking crisis at crisis dates were
estimated by using the procedure outlined above and in Table 4.3 in Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Detragiache
(2001). The probability of success ranges between 0.64 (Portugal) to 1.0 (Belgium, France, Germany
and the U.K.).
• δ: The parameter measures the labor share in output. The value has been set to 0.6, for all the
economies. A labor share of 60 percent is in conformity with the observed world average.11
• c: The parameter captures the proportional cost of monitoring. As Cooley and Nam (1998) points
out that, in equilibrium, monitoring costs are incurred by financial intermediaries only when the
entrepreneurs fail. Hence, these costs can be interpreted as costs of bankruptcy. We follow Cooley and
Nam (1998) and set c at 10 percent.12
• x: The parameter measures the endowment of the entrepreneur and without any loss of generality is
is set at 1.13
11See Zimmermann (1997). Further an alternative value of δ =0.7 was also used while conducting the policy experiments.
qualitative nature of our results stayed the same.
12Varying c does not change our results qualitatively.
13The qualitative nature of our results remain unchanged with alternative choices of x, as long as x>0.
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A second set of parameters is determined individually for each country. Here, we use averages over the
whole sample period to find values that do not depend on the current business cycle. These parameters are
listed in Table 6, along with q.
• gy : The parameter measures the government expenditure to GDP ratio, defining the size of the govern-
ment. Note, we use the ratio of central government outlays to GDP Note the country-specific values
ranges between 14.55 percent (Greece) to 22.95 percent (Belgium).
• RL: The parameter measures the nominal interest rate on loans. The country specific values lies
between 10.01 percent (France) and 22.96 percent (Greece).
• pi = (µ): The parameter measures the annual inflation rate and lies between 3.59 percent (Belgium)
and 15.16 percent (Greece)
• UGE: The parameter measures the size of the underground economy as a percentage of GDP. The
values are obtained from Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) and lies between 12.3 percent (France) to
28.3 percent (Greece).
• τ : The parameter measures the taxes paid as a percentage of the GDP. The country-specific values
lies between 22.2 percent (Greece) to 42.1 percent (Belgium).
• α: The parameter measures the fraction of reported income. Note the calibrated value of the parameter
hinges critically on the measurements of the size of the underground economy. The following method
was used
TE
Y
= UGE × τ (30)
where TEY is tax evasion as a percentage of GDP.
We have assumed that the effective average tax rate is the same in the official and the underground
economy. Given that
(1− α) =
TE
Y
[TEY + τ ]
(31)
The country-specific parameters lie between 0.78 (Greece) and 0.89 (U.K.), which implies that for
Greece 22 percent of the taxes are evaded and for that of U.K. the value is 11 percent.
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• γ: The parameter measures the reserve-deposit ratio and lies between 1.0 percent (Belgium) and 23.5
percent (Greece).
• ε: The annual deposit insurance premium is obtained from Demirgu˙c¸-Kunt and Sobaci (2001). Note
for France and U.K. the deposit insurance is not mandatory and available by demand. We set it at
the average of the values of Belgium and Germany. Otherwise the country-specific values lies between
0.03 percent (Belgium) to 0.64 percent (Greece).
• nˆ: The parameter measures the employment-rate, in the sense that it is one less the average rate
of unemployment. The country-specific values lies between 80.05 percent (Spain) and 93.84 percent
(Portugal). The figures imply that Spain has an unemployment-rate of 19.95 percent where as the
average unemployment-rate for Portugal is 6.16 percent.
A third set of parameters are calculated from the model using the country specific data. The parameters
are also reported in Table 6.
• β: The technology parameter, is set at 5, given that β > 1. Such a choice of β ensures that q(1 +
RL)>c and Πe>x. Formally, the two conditions imply that β> 11+µ
c
q
(
x
nˆδ[1−(1−γ)(1−ατ)]
)
and β>
x
qnˆδ−1[nˆ−δ(1−γt)(1−ατt)] , respectively. Note if the latter holds so would the former condition. To ensure
that β is defined we set the lower limits of γ, τ and µ at 1.0 percent, 22.7 percent and 3.6 percent.
Moreover nˆ and q are set to 0.8005 and 0.64, with c=0.1 and δ=0.6. These values correspond to the
lowest values of the corresponding parameter observed in the data for these 8 economies. In some sense
we carry out a change in location of the policy parameters. It must be realized we are more interested
in analyzing the movements in the policy parameters rather than their absolute value.
item κ: The parameter captures the ratio of the government expenditure to the wage bill and is given
by
g
y
wφ
y
. Note wφy is given by
δ
1+RL
1+pi
. The country-specific values lies between 24.92 percent (Germany)
to 40.88 percent (Belgium).
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
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8 Optimal Policy Decisions
The constrained optimization of the objective function given by equation (27), yields the optimal values of
the decision variables, τ , µ and γ. The deposit-insurance premium is fixed at the country-specific levels
observed in the data.14 The results corresponding to different weights (θ) are reported in Table 7. The
following observations can made:
• There is quite a lot of variability within and across countries. The movements in the money growth
rates and the reserve requirements follows no specific pattern. The results does not overwhelmingly
vindicate our hypothesis that countries with higher probability of crisis should have higher reserve
requirements.
• Except for the extreme case when the social planner values only the welfare of the entrepreneur, the
economies with higher probability of crisis, namely Spain, Greece Italy and Portugal, have higher
income tax rates than that of Belgium, France, Germany and the U.K., which have relatively lower
(zero) probability of bank failures. Moreover, for the former set of economies the tax rates are positively
correlated with the probability of bank failures.
• When the social planner assigns higher weight to the producers relative to the depositor/worker, the
optimal reserve requirements are at unity. Such observations, in some sense, corroborate our findings
for the endowment economy.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
To better understand the movements in the optimal policy variables, we decided to look into the average
economy – an economy constructed with the average values of the the parameters of the eight countries
considered in our sample. We start off by examining the case with tax evasion is set at the lowest level
observed (corresponding to U.K.) and there is no probability of banking crisis, that is α=0.89 and q=1.0.
And then compare the economy with the following three scenarios of the same average-economy: (a) α=0.83
and q=1.0; (b) α=0.89 and q=0.90, and; (c) α=0.83 and q=0.90. Note a value of α=0.83 and a value of
14See Table 6 for the values of the deposit-insurance premia.
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q=0.90 correspond to the averages of the eight economies. The comparison between the baseline average
economy and (a), allows us to evaluate the importance of tax evasion on the sizes of policy parameters, most
importantly on the reserve requirements and test if at all there exists a positive relationship between reserve
requirements and tax evasion. The comparison with (b) enable us to assess the importance of bank failure on
reserve requirements and other policy variable. The experiment in (c) and the comparison with the baseline
economy helps us in outlining the importance of both tax evasion and higher probability of crisis, separately
and simultaneously, on the policy variables. The results are reported in Table 8.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Qualitative nature of the movements of the policy variables are the same as is observed for the eight
countries. Moreover, comparing rows 1 and 2 and then 3 and 4 of Table 8 provide us with distinct evidence
that higher degrees of tax evasion imply non-decreasing reserve requirements. However, as can be seen from
both rows 3 and 4, when compared to 1 and 2, except when θ=0, higher probability of crisis yields higher
income tax rates. Comparison between rows 3 and 4 indicates that when higher degrees of tax evasion is
coupled with higher probability of crisis, tax rates are clearly higher. Interestingly, except when the social
planner weigh the welfare of the entrepreneur more than the worker/depositor, comparing rows 1 and 2
with 3 and 4 indicates that economies with no probability of bank failures tends to have higher reserve
requirements than economies with positive probability of crisis — a result completely opposite to our initial
hypothesis. In summary, the experiments suggest that when controlled for other parameters economies with
higher probability of crisis will have higher tax rates, except when the planner values the producer only.
Finally, in Table 9 we control for the tax rate and fix it at the economy wide average of 32.0 percent, for
the experiments in rows 1 and 2, and at zero for rows 3 and 4. The intuition of such an experiment can be
believed to be a sequential movement of the treasury and the monetary wings of the planner — the treasury
moves first and arbitrarily fixes the tax rate and then the monetary authority optimally chooses the money
growth rates and the reserve requirement to meet the deficit. Or alternatively, the economy can be viewed
as having exhausted its ability to tax. In Table 9 we compare the baseline economy corresponding to α=0.89
and q=1.0 with α=0.83 and q=1.0 in rows 1 and 2. In rows 3 and 4 when τ15 is set at zero we compare the
15Note in this case β=29, to ensure that the firm produces and the bank lends.
22
cases of q=1.0 with q=0.90. Clearly, comparison between rows 1 and 2 suggest that higher degrees of tax
evasion would imply higher reserve requirements, except when the planner values the welfare of the producer
more than the consumers. However, money growth rates are consistently higher in row 2, with higher tax
evasion. Moreover, comparison between rows 3 and 4 indicates that optimal money growth rates are always
higher except for θ=1.0, while reserve requirements stays the same except when the social planner values
the welfare of the depositor/worker more than the producer.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
9 Conclusion
The paper tries to explore two rationale behind the existence of financial repression. We assay whether there
exists a plausible explanation as to why the reserve requirements in the some economies namely, Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, are relatively higher compared to other developed European economies. For this,
we develop an overlapping generation production-economy monetary model with a possibility of banking
crisis.
The results from the model can be summarized as follows: (a) When the government is allowed to choose
its full-range of instruments namely, the tax-rate, the reserve-requirement and the money growth rate, the
social planner will always optimally choose a higher tax-rate for economies with positive probability of crisis;
(b) The tax rates for these economies are positively correlated with the probability of crisis; (c) There is
no clear-cut evidence that countries with positive probability of crisis will have optimally higher reserve
requirements; (d) In the extreme case, when the social planner puts the entire weight on the entrepreneur,
or values the welfare of the entrepreneur more than that of the depositor/worker, the reserve requirements
are set optimally at the 100 percent level, irrespective of the size of probability of bank failures. The model
however indicates, that when we control for the country-specific parameters of the model, higher tax evasion
and higher probability of crisis do correspond high reserve requirements.
Thus to summarize, the model tends to suggest that the ‘high’ reserve requirements are more a fall-out
of the seigniorage motive of the social planner and does not correspond to a welfare maximizing objective in
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the presence of positive probability of crisis, given the availability of an alternative distortionary instrument
(income-tax, in our case). To put it alternatively, if we were to assume that the social planner of an economy
(say our hypothesized behavior corresponding to that of the government of Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal)
with positive probability of crisis was choosing the ‘higher’ reserve requirements to accommodate for the
bailout costs of the bank failures — our model shows that such a policy is not compatible with a welfare
maximizing objective. From the policy perspective, economies with positive probabilities of banking crisis
and hence larger bailout pressures on the government budget, should rely more on direct income taxation
rather than implicit taxes.
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Table 1: Seigniorage Revenue in some European Economies (1980-2002)
Seigniorage Reserves/ Annual Tax
(percentages of Deposits Inflation Evasion
revenue) (percentage) rate (percentage)
Spain 6.4a 12.0 6.8 18.0
Greece 19.4b 22.9 14.9 22.0
Italy 3.7b 11.7 7.5 21.0
Portugal 6.0c 17.5 12.2 18.0
Belgium 0.6c 1.0 3.2 18.0
France 0.5c 2.0 4.1 13.0
Germany 1.5c 5.6 2.5 14.0
UK 0.6c 1.7 5.2 11.0
Source: IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics.
Seigniorage has been calculated from lines 14a and 14c.
Also see notes to Table 1.
a: Excludes the year 2002.
b:Excludes the years 1998-2002.
c: Excludes the years 1999-2002.
See Section 7.
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Table 2: Bank Reserve Ratios
Spain Italy Greece Portugal
1980-1986 15.8 15.5 22.1 20.5
1986-1991 19.3 17.2 19.6 26.4
1992-1997 9.0 10.6 26.0 15.3
1998-2002 3.0 2.3 23.5 7.1
Source: See Table 1.
Table 3: Interest Rate Liberalization and Credit Ceiling Relaxation Dates
Interest Rate Credit Ceiling
Country Liberalization Relaxation
Spain 1984 1959-66
Italy 1980 1973-83
Greece 1980 1982-87
Portugal 1984 1978-91
Belgium 1986 Until 1978
France 1980 1958-85
Germany 1980 None
U.K. 1980 1964-71
Sources:Tables 3.4, 4.1 and 5.1 in Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz (2001).
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Table 4: Interest Rate Liberalization and Banking Crisis Dates
Interest Rate Liberalization Banking Crisis
Country
Spain 1984 1983
Italy 1980 1990-94 and 1997
Greece 1980 1983 and 1991
Portugal 1984 1986-89
Belgium 1986 None
France 1980 None
Germany 1980 None
U.K. 1980 None
Sources:
(a) Tables 3.4, 4.1 and 5.1 in Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz (2001).
(b) Table 1 Ganapolsky (2003).
(c) Bayoumi (1993).
(d) Attanasio and Weber (1994).
(e) IMF- International Financial Statistics.
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Table 5: Calibration of Parameters
Countries q τ UGE α ε nˆ (RL) µ= pi gy γ κ
Spain 0.74 25.5 22.3 0.82 0.10 0.8005 12.89 7.52 16.66 14.10 29.15
Greece 0.92 22.7 28.3 0.78 0.64 0.9122 22.96 15.16 14.55 23.50 25.89
Italy 0.87 36.3 26.2 0.79 0.20 0.8870 15.02 8.58 18.79 13.70 33.17
Portugal 0.64 27.7 22.3 0.82 0.10 0.9384 19.09 13.04 16.59 19.80 29.13
Belgium 1 42.1 21.5 0.82 0.03 0.8778 10.71 3.59 22.95 1.00 40.88
France 1 37.3 14.8 0.87 0.04 0.8927 10.01 4.54 23.24 2.00 40.76
Germany 1 31.8 16.8 0.86 0.05 0.8879 10.85 2.29 16.29 6.00 24.92
UK 1 32.9 12.3 0.89 0.04 0.9129 10.06 5.77 20.51 2.00 35.57
Note: Parameters defined as above.
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